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Abstract
Security is an essential requirement in mobile ad hoc network (MANETs) [1]. Compared to wired networks, MANETs are more
vulnerable to security attacks due to the lack of a trusted centralized authority and limited resources. This paper simulates the
behaviour of Blackhole node in AODV protocol in NS2 and proposes a technique to avoid it in AODV [2] routing protocol
using Triangular Encryption [3] in NS2 [4] [5]. Triangular Encryption has been chosen because of its low computation overhead.
Comparison with existing blackhole detection technique [6] reveals that the proposed technique obtains better results.
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1. Introduction
. In a MANET, a collection of mobile hosts with wireless network interfaces form a temporary network without
the aid of any ﬁxed infrastructure or centralized administration. A MANET is referred to as an infrastructure less
network because the mobile nodes in the network dynamically set up paths among themselves to transmit packets
temporarily. In aMANET, nodes within each other’s wireless transmission ranges can communicate directly; however,
nodes outside each other’s range have to rely on some other nodes to relay messages. Any routing protocol must
encapsulate an essential set of security mechanism. These mechanisms are used to prevent, detect and respond to
security attacks.[1]
. The Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV)[2] algorithm enables dynamic, self-starting, multihop routing
between participating mobile nodes wishing to establish and maintain an ad hoc network. AODV allows mobile
nodes to obtain routes quickly for new destinations,and does not require nodes to maintain routes to destinations that
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are not in active communication. AODV allows mobile nodes to respond to link breakages and changes in network
topology in a timely manner. The operation of AODV is loop-free, and by avoiding the Bellman-Ford ”counting to
inﬁnity” problem oﬀers quick convergence when the ad hoc network topology changes (typically, when a node moves
in the network). When links break, AODV causes the aﬀected set of nodes to be notiﬁed so that they are able to
invalidate the routes using the lost link.[2]
. The blackhole attack [7] has two properties. First, the node exploits the mobile ad hoc routing protocol, such as
AODV, to advertise itself as having a valid route to a destination node, even though the route is spurious, with the
intention of intercepting packets. Second, the attacker consumes the intercepted packets without any forwarding.
However, the attacker runs the risk that neighboring nodes will monitor and expose the ongoing attacks. There
is a more subtle form of these attacks when an attacker selectively forwards packets. An attacker suppresses or
modiﬁes packets originating from some nodes, while leaving the data from the other nodes unaﬀected, which limits
the suspicion of its wrongdoing.[1]
. NS is an object oriented simulator, written in C++, with an OTcl interpreter as a frontend. The simulator supports a
class hierarchy in C++ (also called the compiled hierarchy ), and a similar class hierarchy within the OTcl interpreter
(also called the interpreted hierarchy in this document). The two hierarchies are closely related to each other; from
the user’s perspective, there is a one-to-one correspondence between a class in the interpreted hierarchy and one in the
compiled hierarchy. The root of this hierarchy is the class TclObject. Users create new simulator objects through the
interpreter; these objects are instantiated within the interpreter, and are closely mirrored by a corresponding object in
the compiled hierarchy. The interpreted class hierarchy is automatically established through methods deﬁned in the
class TclClass. user instantiated objects are mirrored through methods deﬁned in the class TclObject. There are other
hierarchies in the C++ code and OTcl scripts; these other hierarchies are not mirrored in the manner of TclObject.
[5][8]
. The nomenclature followed for this proposed technique, Triangular Encryption (TE) [3] Technique is on the basis of
structure that is supposed to be formed out of the source as well as diﬀerent intermediate and ﬁnal block of bits during
the process of bits encryption. In fact, an equilateral triangular shape is formed if the source block of bits and diﬀerent
intermediate blocks along with the ﬁnal 1-bit block are known in line-by-line manner. Now the basic characteristics
of this TE technique, is the use of the Boolean operations. Another important aspect of this TE technique is that here
is no question of the positional reorientation of bits; rather all the bits in a block are directing participating in Boolean
expression. TE technique is a bit level technique; the stream of bits corresponding to the source ﬁle to be encrypted
is to be decomposed into a ﬁnite number of blocks that are advised to be of varying lengths. For each of the blocks,
the technique of TE is to be applied to generate the corresponding target block. In Triangular Encryption technique,
from a source block of size, say, n, an intermediate block of size (n-1) is generated by applying the exclusive NOR
(XNOR) operation between each two consecutive bits of size (n-1) to generate a block of size (n- 2). The process goes
on until the generation of a 1-bit block. All these blocks under consideration together form an equilateral triangle-like
shape. On formation of such a triangular shape, putting together either the MBSs or the LSBs of all the blocks under
consideration in either sequence, the target block is formed in this regard, the key takes a vital role because only by
knowing this key the receiver of the message can under stand on how the target block is chosen from the triangular
shape. The key is a secret. The encrypted stream of bits is generated by putting together all the target blocks.[3]
2. Literature Review
The classiﬁcation of attacks inMANET, both active and passive is done in Jawandhiya et al. [1]. Blackhole attack is
one of the most prominent attacks mentioned in it.The implementation of simulations and avoidance of blackhole node
behaviour was previously done by Semih [6] and Bo Sun et al [7]. Our implementation closely follows the guidelines
given by Ross et. al. [9] in implementing a new manet protocol and Semih [6]. The implementation of AODV
protocol in NS2 is done almost blindly following Perkin et. al [2].The implementation of Triangular Encryption is
done following the method mentioned by Dutta [3]. This paper also closely follows the guidelines as mentioned in
Marc Gries Tutorial [5] and the ns Manual [8]
526   Nabarun Chatterjee and Jyotsna Kumar Mandal /  Procedia Technology  10 ( 2013 )  524 – 529 
3. The Methodology
In the article by Fransisco J. Ross et. al. [9] it is shown how a new unicast manet protocol can be implemented
in NS2. It is a generic implementation and we do not need to make all the changes as mentioned in the article by
Fransisco J. Ross et. al.[9]. Our simulation follows closely the implementation mentioned in the article by Semih
Dokurer [6]. In our work, we have used the nodes that exhibit black hole behavior in wireless ad-hoc network
that use AODV protocol. Since blackhole nodes behave in a diﬀerent manner as compared to aodv nodes, we have
implemented a new routing protocol to simulate the behaviour.
Precondition: Sender and Reciever have the
same partition and key of triangular encryption
Algorithm
1. The sender sends a RREQ packet which contains a plain text.
2. When a node recieves the RREQ packet
if(not(Reciever)) then
if((has better route to reciever) ||
(has shorter route to reciever) then




Encrypt the plaintext in the packet with
the partition and key preagreed upon
Send a RREP towards the sender with the cipher text
fi
3. When a node node recieves a RREP packet
if(not(Sender)) then //By Sender we mean the
// original source of the RREQ packet
Forward the packet towards sender
else
if(RREP packet contains the required cipher) then
Forward data packets to the last forwarder
of the RREP packet
else
Drop the RREP packet
fi
fi
Fig 1: Algorithm for the avoidance of Blackhole Node Behaviour using Triangular Encryption
There is a pre agreement between the reciever and the sender on the partition and the key of the triangular encr-
pytion. When the sender sends a RREQ packet it also sends a plain text with the packet. When a node intermediate
node realises that it may have a possible route , instead of sending a reply it forwards the RREQ packet towards the
destination. When the destination of the RREQ packet recieves the packet , it encrypts the plaintext with the pre
agreed partition and key and sends it back, within the RREP packet.The intermediate nodes on recieving the packet
update their index and hop count on the way back. As the RREP packet contains the cipher text it is sure to have
reached the destination. As we know that the blackhole nodes send a reply without consulting the routing table , so it
is not possible that it can have the cipher text while making the RREP packet. So no packets are dropped except for
the cases when the blackhole node actually has the shortest route. When a sender aodv node recieves a RREP packet
with a better route, it checks whether the packet has the matching cipher. The algorithm for avoidance of Blackhole
node behaviour using Triangular encryption is shown in Figure 1.
4. Results
The simulation was done with 20,25,30,35,40 nodes. The simulation was done in TCl. With 5 simulations for
each in both AODV Blackhole Aodv environments, the sceneraios for which were created using the stedest com-
mand.In each case the number of packets sent, recieved, dropped and percentage of packets recieved were recorded
by analysing the trace ﬁle.The results are shown in the tables 1 to 5 for varying number of nodes 20,25,30,35 and 40
respectively.
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Table 1. Result for 20 nodes
No. AODV BLACKHOLE
Sent Recv Drop % Sent Recv Drop %
1 9825 9579 246 97 9868 7201 2667 72
2 9764 9491 273 97 9723 6118 3605 62
3 9672 9407 265 97 9624 8249 1375 85
4 9786 9495 291 97 9834 8299 1535 84
5 9387 9065 322 96 9548 7527 2021 78
It can be noted from the table 1 that the recieve percentages are not consistent. It depend upto a certain extent on the
scenario and node movements created by the setdest program.
Table 2. Result for 25 nodes
No. AODV BLACKHOLE
Sent Recv Drop % Sent Recv Drop %
1 13252 12677 575 95 13238 10801 2437 81
2 13029 12553 476 96 12992 8800 4192 67
3 12757 12364 393 96 12815 11048 1767 86
4 13258 12777 481 96 13291 10395 2896 78
5 12919 12443 476 96 12991 9659 3332 74
Though the numbers of nodes increases we have kept the number of blackholes ﬁxed to 2 as it is highly improbable
that there are many blackhole nodes in a given scenario, as seen from Table 2
Table 3. Result for 30 nodes
No. AODV BLACKHOLE
Sent Recv Drop % Sent Recv Drop %
1 15164 14540 624 95 15218 12432 2786 81
2 15066 14417 649 95 15274 12619 2655 82
3 15176 14483 693 95 15315 12373 2942 80
4 14969 14281 688 95 15192 12207 2985 80
5 15175 14632 543 96 15195 11834 3361 77
It can be noted from table 3 that the recieve percentages increases as the number of nodes in the simulations
increases .This is due to the fact that as there are ﬁxed number of blackhole nodes, they are not able to aﬀect all the
communations between the diﬀerent senders and recievers.
Table 4. Result for 35 nodes
No. AODV BLACKHOLE
Sent Recv Drop % Sent Recv Drop %
1 17409 16594 815 96 17332 14292 3040 82
2 17441 16675 766 95 17434 14533 2901 83
3 17443 16840 603 96 17489 15523 2066 88
4 17255 16354 901 94 17328 14162 3166 81
5 17378 16514 864 95 17351 14397 2954 82
It can also be noted from Table 4 that the rate of increase of the recieve percentages slows down when the number of
nodes increases. This is due to the bounding area in the simulations in which the nodes are allowed to move.
Table 5. Result for 40 nodes
No. AODV BLACKHOLE
Sent Recv Drop % Sent Recv Drop %
1 20589 19572 1017 95 20576 17572 3004 85
2 20520 19642 878 95 20490 17878 2612 87
3 20593 19339 1254 93 20576 17572 3004 85
4 20613 19664 949 95 20576 18325 2251 89
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It can be noted from Table 5 that the amount of drop also depends on how many transmissions it is aﬀect in its random
path. Row 4 shows a signiﬁcant rise in recieve percentage
5. Analysis
The graph of Figure 2 shows the comparison of percentage of packets recieved in each of the simulation with
increasing number of nodes . In each of the simulations in blackhole results and aodv with te there were 2 blackhole
nodes.It is to be noted the recieve percentages shown are done after taking in account not only blackhole drops but
also other common network errors.It can be seen that the use of triangular encryption almost eliminates the blackhole
node behaviour.
Fig 2: Comparison between the recieve percentages vs number of nodes in scenarios with only aodv, aodv with blackhole nodes
and aodv with triangular encryption and blackhole nodes.
Fig 3:Comparison between the recieve percentages in our triangular encryption technique and Semih’s technique
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Semih [6] also states a way to avoid blackhole node behaviour. It has 5 simulations for 20 nodes. A comparison
of their and our results is given in Figure 3.
The table below shows a comparison of the our blackhole avoidance and Semih [6] blackhole avoidance. The above
ﬁgure clearly shows that our algorithm is able to Blackhole behaviour in a considerably better way than the one
mentioned in Semih’s[6]
Table 6. Comparison Between Blackhole Avoidance using Triangular encryption and Semih’s [6] Avoidance Technique
No. Our Avoidance Semih’s Avoidance
Sent Drop % Sent Drop %
1 9931 347 4 9708 2615 27
2 9544 353 4 9776 2870 29
3 9765 254 3 8848 3063 35
4 9802 268 3 9670 2711 28
5 9343 464 5 9296 3063 33
6. Future Work
In our work we only avoided blackhole behaviour but could not detect and eliminate blackhole nodes. The modiﬁed
AODV protocol takes more time in functioning but it could not be calculated. A measure of the time would give us an
understanding if the modiﬁed AODV is good enough.
7. Limitations
The implementaion becomes very slow as the number of nodes increases.The number of packet sent is much more
than the original AODV protocol and thus it increases network load.
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